Acting Right? Left-Wing Strength and Privatization

I present a theoretical account of the politics of privatization that predicts left- wing support for the policy is conditional on the long-run strength of left-wing parties in a political system. My claim is in marked contrast to predictions derived from a traditional interest group approach. I argue that a stronger systemic position will make it more likely that left-wing parties will engage in privatization programmes that are likely to be at least partially detrimental to traditionally left-leaning interest groups. At root, left-wing parties face a trade-off between protecting the basis of their electoral strength and enhancing macroeconomic performance. The balance of this trade-off varies based upon the prevailing level of left-wing strength. Quantitative evidence from 15 Western European countries over the period 1980–2004 supports the theoretical claim.

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