Democratic Inequality and the Economic Vote

Bartels (2008) in his recent book, Unequal Democracy, speculates that `...a great deal of economic inequality in contemporary America is a curious byproduct of peculiarities in voting behaviour utterly unrelated to voters' taste or tolerance for inequality.' The conclusion is based on the analysis of ANES election data. He demonstrates that voters, in particular low-income voters, focus very myopically – and in an entirely non-self interested fashion - on short-term economic outcomes; moreover on short-term outcomes that favour the most affluent in American society. Bartels argues that because of this myopia the less-well off segments of the American electorate have discounted economic improvements that have objectively benefited them and have favoured very short-term economic improvements. The result is that they reward incumbents who on balance have generated economic outcomes that have hurt them. This behaviour has lead to the electoral success of Republican presidential candidates that have implemented policies that have significantly increased economic inequality in America. This in fact may have implications for electoral contexts in addition to the U.S. As Duch and Stevenson (2008) have recently established for 20 countries – and as Bartels points out for the U.S. context - the economic vote is large and pervasive throughout developed democracies. If the Bartels result regarding the economic vote is correct and if it generalizes to most other democratic contexts, it suggests a fascinating unintended consequence of electoral democracy.