Electoral Incentives, Group Identity and Preferences for Redistribution

In this paper, we build on recent work by Glaeser (2005), Scheve and Stasavage (2006) and Huber and Stanig (2007) to theorize the conditions under which politicians have electoral incentives to provoke group identities and how this have a subsequent impact on individual preferences for redistribution. We argue that those strategic incentives respond to between group inequality, the relative size of groups and electoral institutions. Thus, individual-level preferences for redistribution respond to both individual characteristics (group identification and position in the income distribution) as well as national level characteristics. We contribute to recent work suggesting that strong group-based identification reduces preferences for redistribution by arguing that the strength of those identifications is conditioned by national politicians with varying incentives to mobilize group identities. We test this argument using hierarchical linear modelling to analyze individual-level and national-level data across countries (ISSP, WVS), across U.S. states, and across Spanish regions.